Posts Tagged ‘Teoría de la conciencia’

“Lenguaje y sociedad”: Henri Lefevbre

24/10/2014 Deja un comentario

henri-lefebvre-lenguaje-y-sociedad-16255-MLA20117129073_062014-FPublicada en 1967 (Gallimard, Paris), esta obra sintetiza una orientación original en los estudios actuales del lenguaje.

La lingüística moderna ha progresado en forma notable desde Ferdinand de Saussure con los métodos y las técnicas del estructuralismo. ¿Puede tomarse como modelo para las ciencias de la realidad humana y hasta para el conjunto de las ciencias?

Henri Lefevbre parte de una hipótesis: que preguntas y respuestas no pueden plenamente formularse desde el interior del lenguaje. Es conveniente ubicarse en un sitio de encuentro de la lingüistica con la sociología, y la investigación desemboca entonces en los problemas de la sociedad contemporánea. Leer más…

“Biological Determinism and Epistemology in Linguistics: Some Considerations on the “Chomskyan Revolution””: Peter Jones

24/10/2014 Deja un comentario

Biological Determinism and Epistemology in Linguistics: Some Considerations on the “Chomskyan Revolution” [1]

“Given the molecular forces in a mutton chop, deduce Hamlet or Faust therefrom”.[2]


0.1 The aim of this paper is to take a critical look, from a broadly Marxist perspective, at the epistemological basis of Noam Chomsky’s theory of grammar and the implications of his work in linguistics for the human sciences in general.[3] At the very least this critique might help to explain the reasons why Chomsky’s views should be regarded as incompatible with Marxism, despite some recent claims (eg Newmeyer, 1986a,b). More importantly, I hope the discussion may show that Chomsky’s outlook on language poses a challenge not only to Marxism but to any discipline in which the social and historical are essential and irreducible categories in the understanding and explanation of human behaviour, institutions, and thought. For Chomsky uses his theoretical linguistic work, which has already had a profound influence on other disciplines, particularly philosophy and psychology (cf Salkie, 1990) as the ground on which to construct a rigid biological determinist ideology applied to all aspects of human behaviour and mental activity. The main thrust of my argument is that Chomsky’s biological determinism, like biological determinism in general, rests on an incoherent and self-contradictory epistemology and is an inadequate foundation for the human sciences, including linguistics. In view of these intended aims, I would like to think that what follows might be considered as a further contribution to the critique of biological determinism developed in Rose (ed) (1982) and Rose, Lewontin and Kamin (1990).

0.2 I do not claim any originality for philosophical opposition to Chomsky’s work and specifically Marxist criticism can be found elsewhere (eg Thompson, 1969; Luria, 1975; llyenkov, 1977c; Panfilov, 1979; and cf the discussion in Newmeyer, 1986a). What I hope to offer is a rather more fine-grained philosophical analysis of aspects of Chomsky’s approach along with a sketch of an alternative perspective which I will refer to as the Vygotskian tradition of Marxist research in psychology and linguistics.[4] While detailed scrutiny of the technical linguistic facts and arguments used to support Chomsky’s case would be out of place here, I will make one or two observations on the status and validity of such “evidence”.

Since Chomsky has at the same time acquired an international reputation as a courageous, outspoken, and radical political thinker and commentator (cf Salkie, op.cit; Chomsky 1979, 1987b, 1989), the question inevitably arises of the connection between his linguistics and politics. Some writers consider both areas of his thought to be equally radical and progressive, eg Salkie (op.cit). I share the view that his scientific and political views have certain philosophical and ethical principles in common and, accordingly, I have raised some general questions on his attitude towards social and political theory. However, I shall not examine Chomksy’s political contribution in any detail, nor do I wish to denigrate that contribution in any way.

I should stress that not all linguists outside the Marxist tradition share Chomsky’s conception of language and mind. Some would challenge or reject outright the innatist framework of Chomskyan generativism (eg Sampson, 1975; Moore and Carling, 1982; Halliday, 1978; Harris, 1980) and there are many other linguists who, while working with Chomsky’s grammatical theory, would distance themselves from his biological determinism. Yet, there are few, if any, modern approaches to language which remain uninfluenced by Chomsky’s work and ideas. Whether or not Chomsky’s theoretical achievements amount to a revolution will not, however, be of concern here, although the question has generated some heat over the years (cf Koerner, 1983; Newmeyer, 1986b).

My plan of attack, then, is as follows: 1) an exposition of the key tenets of the Chomskyan doctrine on grammar, 2) an analysis of the epistemological foundations of this doctrine, 3) a critical appraisal of these foundations, and 4) a brief exposition of the Vygotskian alternative. Leer más…

“Eisenstein/ Vygotsky /Luria’s project: Cinematic Thinking and the Integrative Science of Mind and Brain”: Julia Vassilieva

26/09/2014 Deja un comentario


When Sergei Eisenstein died on the 11th of February 1948, a post-mortem examination was conducted to establish the cause of death. His body was subjected to a dissection and his brain was exposed, measured and photographed. The photographs of Eisenstein’s brain were kept by his friend of thirty years, neuropsychologist Alexander Luria, who would show them to his students to illustrate the asymmetry of the brain’s hemispheres. Eisenstein’s brain featured a dramatically enlarged right hemisphere, which is responsible for visual images and spatial information processing, while his left hemisphere was of a normal size.[1] This striking image provides an apt illustration for one of the most challenging and enduring intellectual projects at the intersection of film theory, psychology and philosophy: that of trying to understand how mind, brain and cinema interact. It was also a postscript to Eisenstein and Luria’s scientific collaboration, which at various stages included the linguist Alexander Marr and cultural psychologist Lev Vygotsky. The research program they carried out, from the mid-1920s until Eisenstein’s death, aimed to combine neuroscience, social sciences, and cinema theory to address the neural basis and semiotics of screen aesthetics.

This collaboration reveals and confirms Eisenstein’s status as a theoretician with broad interdisciplinary interests, as has been increasingly acknowledged in the scholarly literature.[2] As Francesco Casetti notes: “In Eisenstein we find a constant urge to operate in the interstices of different sciences, between linguistics and anthropology, between psychology and aesthetics, between the history of art and biology.”[3] While some aspects of Eisenstein’s theoretical activity – such as his engagement with linguistics and anthropology [4] – have been explored more extensively, his extensive engagement with the emerging discipline of psychology in the first half of the 20th century remains underestimated.
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“Marxismo: Cultura, ideología y hegemonía. Comunicación y lucha de clases”: Néstor Kohan

15/09/2014 Deja un comentario

Teoría marxista de la cultura, la ideología y la hegemonía.

Comunicación y lucha de clases. De los Simpson y Hollywood a Marx y Lenin, Antonio Gramsci y la Escuela de Frankfurt, Fredric Jameson, Raymond Williams, Terry Eagleton y Pierre Bourdieu. De la Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional (de Estados Unidos) a Rodolfo Walsh, Haroldo Conti y Raymundo Gleyzer. Las nuevas tareas en el siglo XXI. Proyecto Memoria del futuro: BRANCALEONE FILMS y CATEDRA CHE GUEVARA: Leer más…

“El carácter enigmático de las Tesis sobre Feurbach y su secreto”: Miguel Candiotti

08/09/2014 Deja un comentario
a4d64-marxyengelsLos breves rayos de luz que se encuentran en las Tesis sobre Feuerbach encandilan a todos los filósofos que se le acercan, pero todos sabemos que un rayo enceguece en lugar de iluminar, y que nada es más difícil de situar en el espacio de la noche que un estallido de luz que la rompe. Será sin duda necesario hacer visible, algún día, lo enigmático de esas once tesis falsamente transparentes. LOUIS ALTHUSSER (1967, 29).


Como se sabe, Marx no escribió las Tesis sobre Feuerbach (TF) con la idea de publicarlas, sino más bien como un material preparatorio para la redacción de La ideología alemana (IA), que iniciaría más tarde durante el mismo año –1845– junto a Engels. Sin embargo, esta voluminosa obra no pudo ser editada en esos tiempos, y sus autores, conformes con haber logrado a través de ella esclarecer sus propias ideas, abandonaron la pretensión de publicarla (cf. Marx, 1981a, 519). Paradójicamente, en 1888, más de cuarenta años más tarde, el viejo Engels se decidió a dar a conocer las TF, pero silenciosamente retocadas por su pluma y completamente aisladas de IA, cuya publicación desestimó alegando que “en el manuscrito no figura la crítica de la doctrina feuerbachiana”. Hoy sabemos que esto último es falso, aunque sea cierto, en efecto, que “la parte dedicada a Feuerbach no está terminada” (Engels, 1981, 354). Debieron pasar otros cuarenta años hasta que por fin se publicaron –entre 1924 y 1926– tanto la versión original de las TF redactada por Marx como la parte de IA que contiene las críticas a Feuerbach 1. Esto significa que durante unos ochenta años –que es casi la mitad del tiempo que lleva vivo el materialismo histórico– tanto sus seguidores como sus detractores se vieron privados de la lectura y la confrontación de estos dos textos mellizos, en los que nuestros autores llevaron a cabo nada menos que su “ajuste de cuentas” con la “conciencia filosófica anterior” (Marx, 1981a, 519). Y también significa que durante casi cuatro décadas se accedió únicamente a las TF –y en la versión publicada por Engels–, lo cual trajo como consecuencia algunas serias confusiones. Porque si bien Engels acierta al señalar que este escrito posee “un valor inapreciable, por ser el primer documento en que se contiene el germen genial de la nueva concepción del mundo”, también atina al advertir que se trata de “notas tomadas para desarrollarlas más tarde, notas escritas a vuelapluma y no destinadas en modo alguno a la publicación” (1981, 354). Ahora bien, precisamente por esto último, resulta lamentable que él no pudiera prever los malentendidos que tales notas generarían mientras no pudieran ser cotejadas con la sección dedicada a Feuerbach de IA 2. Leer más…

“Vygotsky’s revolutionary theory 
of psychological development” Jeremy Sawyer

05/09/2014 Deja un comentario

“It seems surprising that the science of psychology has avoided the idea that many mental processes are social and historical in origin, or that important manifestations of human consciousness have been directly shaped by the basic practices of human activity and the actual forms of culture.”
—Vygotsky’s colleague Alexander Luria 1

Prevailing ideas hold that human psychology originates in the isolated individual. Whether determined by genes, stimulus-response conditioning, or computer-like data processing modules, the dominant schools of psychology assume a historically static, lone individual as the starting point for investigation. From the hardwired “caveman brain” of evolutionary psychology, to the manipulative “reward and punish” tactics of pop behaviorism, these psychological doctrines are generally pessimistic about the possibility of progressive human change and transformation.

Fortunately, there is a scientific alternative that progressives can advance. The past few decades have seen a renewed interest in the life and work of Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934). Aspects of his work, most notably the “zone of proximal development” (ZPD), are now frequently taught within psychology, education, and special education programs (although applied only sporadically within today’s test-driven public schools). Although Vygotskian theory was conspicuously absent from my school psychology training program, when Vygotsky is taught, it is typically in piecemeal fashion, completely divorced from its revolutionary political roots. It would seem the Left has much to gain from examining and reestablishing this connection.
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“Word Meaning is Important”: Andy Blunden

27/06/2014 Deja un comentario

Perezhivanie as a word in the English language

The Russian language does not use definite or indefinite articles, so in appropriating a Russian word into the English language, and thereby giving perezhivanie an English meaning, the writer has to make a decision as to whether ‘perezhivanie’ is a countable noun or a mass noun. As a mass noun, it can be used in sentences like “Perezhivanie is the source of all personal development.” As a countable noun, it can be used in phrases like “A perezhivanie I had as a child changed my life,” or “The perezhivanie of being left on my own at such an age was traumatic,” or “Some perezhivanija have a profound effect on development.” We do not need John Dewey’s article “Having An Experience” to tell us that ‘an experience’ has a different meaning from ‘experience’. Every native English speaker knows this, except that very few English speakers indeed are consciously aware of the distinction between countable nouns and mass nouns; this is generally known only to experts in English grammar. Ordinary native English-speakers will become aware of the difference when the shop assistant, who is a Sikh, says “We have many equipments in this store”; even though the native English speaker will always use ‘equipment’ correctly, we do it without conscious awareness of the grammatical rule implicit in the usage. ‘Tool’ is a unit of equipment, ‘equipment’ is not a unit of anything. Given that the countable/mass distinction is absent from the Russian language and native English speakers are generally unaware of the distinction, it is not surprising that native Russian speakers will say things like “perezhivanie is unit of consciousness.” However, when a native English-speaker emulates this broken English they reveal that they do not understand the meaning of the word ‘unit’, which can only refer to a countable noun. It makes no difference if the neolog ‘experiencing’ is used instead of appropriating perezhivanie. As a neolog,  ‘experiencing’ can be countable or mass according to its usage, and being simply a translation of perezhivanie, those who use it always use it as a mass noun thereby depriving the word ‘unit’ of its meaning – both the scientific sense in which Vygotsky used it, and the everyday sense. ‘Perezhivanie’  is a countable noun and its plural is ‘perezhivanija’. Perezhivanija are units of consciousness in Vygotsky’s theory. Leer más…

“La dialéctica antigua como forma de pensamiento”: Evald Vasilievich Iliénkov

16/06/2014 Deja un comentario


Presentación……………………………………………………………………………………… 3
La dialéctica antigua como forma de pensamiento. ……………………………. 4
[El surgimiento de la filosofía].. ……………………………………………………… 8
[Naturfilosofía de los primeros filósofos] ………………………………………. 20
[La sofística] ……………………………………………………………………………….. 23
[Sócrates-Platón] ………………………………………………………………………… 28
[Aristóteles] ………………………………………………………………………………… 39
[Filosofía helenística] …………………………………………………………………… 53

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Nueva edición de “La dialéctica leninista y la metafísica del positivismo” de Evald Iliénkov

02/06/2014 Deja un comentario

Título: La dialéctica leninista y la metafísica del positivismo
Autor: Evald Iliénkov
242 páginas
15×21 cm
Año de la edición: 2014
ISBN: 978-9978-346-06-8
Precio: $6.00 (USD)

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“Lenin’s Encounter with Hegel after Eighty Years: A Critical Assessment”: Kevin B. Anderson

02/06/2014 Deja un comentario

“Lenin renewed authentic Marxism not least by a recourse to the “core” of the Hegelian dialectic (“Contradiction is the root of all movement and life”) and to the selfsame Hegelian Logic…Thus it was precisely orthodox Marxism, restored by Lenin, which presupposed a knowledge of Hegel; as against a vulgar, traditionless, and schematic Marxism which, in isolating Marx — as if his thought emerged like a shot out of a pistol — isolated itself from Marx.”

Ernst Bloch (1962 [1949], 382-83)

“He did not read or study Hegel seriously until 1914-15. Also, if one considers it objectively, one notices a great difference in tone and content between the Notebooks on the Dialectic and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Lenin’s thought becomes supple, alive …in a word, dialectical. Lenin did not fully understand the dialectic until 1914, after the collapse of the International… Here we see the significance of the profound reticence of the Stalinists toward the Notebooks, who for a long time put them aside in favor of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.”

Henri Lefebvre (1959, 85)

“The emphasis that Lenin put on “dialectic proper, as a philosophic science” separated him from all other post-Marx Marxists, not only up to the Russian Revolution but also after the conquest of power… What was most manifest of what he had gained from the 1914-15 Hegel studies was that the Hegelian dialectic needs to be studied “in and for itself”…That Lenin kept his direct encounter with the Hegelian dialectic — his Abstract of Hegel’s Science of Logic — to himself, however, shows the depth of the economist mire into which the whole Second International, and not just the German Social-Democracy, had sunk; revolutionaries stood on the same ground!”

Raya Dunayevskaya (1991 [1982], 116)

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“The Althusserian Cul-de-Sac”: Kevin B. Anderson

26/05/2014 1 comentario

The French philosopher Louis Althusser’s structuralist Marxism remains a point of reference for many contemporary schools of radical thought, even for some of those that have moved away from Marxism completely.  Moreover, as radical thought has experienced a partial return to Marx after several decades of Nietzschean post-structuralism, the legacy of Althusser lies in wait, offering version of Marxism that offers an all-too-comfortable transition from the more recent forms of philosophical radicalism. This is because one can embrace Althusser while still rejecting subjectivity, humanism, and even the dialectic.

The possibility of subjectivity in the sense of critique, resistance, or revolt on the part of the subjugated, is closed off almost completely in the work of Althusser.  This stance mars his well-known essay on “ideological superstructures,” which was indeed a serious attempt to go beyond reductionist arguments concerning ideology’s relationship to its material base, and to theorize its place in late twentieth century capitalist society in terms of institutions outside value production like religion and education. Leer más…

“Explorando la conciencia de la clase trabajadora: una crítica a la teoría de la -aristocracia obrera-”: Charles Post

19/05/2014 Deja un comentario


La noción de aristocracia obrera es una de las más antiguas explicaciones marxistas del conservadurismo y reformismo de la clase trabajadora. Sin embargo, a pesar de su persistente atractivo entre los investigadores y militantes de izquierda, no existe una teoría coherente y única sobre la aristocracia obrera. Si bien todas las versiones afirman que el conservadurismo y el reformismo de la clase trabajadora reflejan la política de una capa privilegiada de trabajadores, no puede verificarse de forma empírica la existencia de una capa privilegiada de trabajadores que participan de las sobreganancias monopólicas obtenidas por la clase capitalista y por lo tanto estas no pueden explicar los diferenciales de salario entre trabajadores nacionales e internacionales.

Palabras clave: Aristocracia obrera – Imperialismo – Conciencia de clase. Leer más…

“Los Manuscritos de 1844 de Marx en mi vida y en mi obra”: Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez

25/04/2014 Deja un comentario

Los organizadores del presente ciclo de mesas redondas sobre “Capitalismo mundial y crítica total de la sociedad burguesa. Karl Marx, 1844-1994 a 150 años de los Manuscritos de París”, decidieron generosamente abrir un espacio, a modo de un homenaje que a la vez me abruma y me honra, tomando en cuenta —supongo yo— la atención que he prestado desde hace ya más de treinta años a la obra juvenil marxiana que constituye el hilo conductor de este ciclo. Los textos míos que tienen que ver más directamente con esa obra (Las ideas estéticas de Marx, Filosofía de la praxis y Filosofía y economía en el joven Marx) han sido objeto de las dos exposiciones que hemos  escuchado: por parte de Silvia Duran con respecto al primero de ellos, de Jorge Veraza, en relación con los dos restantes, antes citados. Ya por el simple hecho de prestarles semejante atención, expreso a ambos ponentes mi más sincero agradecimiento.

Aunque me referiré más adelante a ambas exposiciones en cuanto que se ocupan, desde diferentes ángulos de dos campos temáticos que he cultivado: la estética y la filosofía de la praxis, quiero anunciarles que voy a hablar, en primer lugar, de mi relación o trato con los Manuscritos de 1844. Me permito recordar a los presentes, jóvenes en su mayoría, que desde que yo me ocupé por primera vez de esta obra juvenil marxiana en un ensayo titulado “Ideas estéticas en los Manuscritos económico-filosóficos de Marx” han pasado treinta y tres años. La distancia en el tiempo con los otros textos míos, antes mencionados es menor, aunque no mucho menos. Desde entonces, ha corrido mucha agua bajo el puente de la teoría, pero sobre todo bajo el de la práctica. Y como yo no he querido nadar contra esa corriente, debo advertir que los textos antes citados no son los mismo para mí (es decir, no tienen una identidad inmutable), ni yo soy tampoco el mismo en relación a ellos. Lo cual no significa, como habremos de ver, que deje de reconocer cierta permanencia en el cambio: justamente la que me permite en estos tiempos de desencantos, incertidumbres y rupturas sinceras u oportunistas, seguir considerándome marxista. Leer más…

“Hegel e a ‘Alienação'”: Evald Vasilievich Ilienkov

16/04/2014 Deja un comentario

Qualquer intenção de reanalisar criticamente a filosofia hegeliana do direito tropeça imediatamente com os problemas muito agudos de nosso século XX, e justamente com aqueles que praticamente ainda não foram resolvidos. Por isso Hegel se converte imediatamente em pretexto para o descobrimento das discrepâncias atuais, e qualquer interpretação de Hegel é implicitamente expressão de uma ou outra posição ideológica (consciente ou inconscientemente). Em particular, isso existe justamente na filosofia do direito, porque se trata aqui diretamente daquelas coisas como o Estado, a propriedade, a sociedade e a personalidade etc. Como resultado, Hegel se apresenta como uma representação a sua maneira não desenvolvida da contemporaneidade, do século XX, als seiner Keim1. Por isso as interpretações de Hegel sempre têm – seja ou não evidente – um objetivo subentendido: “Das Böse im Keim zu ersticken”2. Ou ao contrário: “Das Gute im Keim zu pflegen”3. Isso está claro naqueles giros da linguagem como, por exemplo, o “Criptohegelianismo de Stalin”4, que, a propósito, na verdade significam o contrário: “Criptostalinismo de Hegel”… Leer más…

“Filosofía soviética y algo más”: David Bakhurst entrevistado por Richard Marshall

09/04/2014 1 comentario

David Bakhurst nos habla mientras suena Virginia Plain(1) de los pensadores políticos rusos, la filosofía soviética, Illyenkov, Mikhailov, Vygotsky y sus demonios, el marxista hegeliano Deborin, los mecanicistas, la formación de la razón, John McDowell, la segunda naturaleza y el naturalismo, Jonathan Dancy y el particularismo, así como del estatus de la filosofía de la educación ya sea si Michael Oakeshott puede ser redimido o no. Para que disfruten…

RM: ¿Qué te hizo convertirte en filósofo? ¿Fuiste siempre un enigma?

David Bakhurst: Aunque tengo dos hermanas, son mucho mayores que yo, así que durante los años en que crecí era una especie de hijo único con un montón de oportunidades para hacer cosas en solitario. Supongo que estoy angustiado por naturaleza y, junto con las ansiedades normales cosa de la infancia, muchas de mis preocupaciones tomaron una forma más metafísica. Cuando tenía unos diez años, mi madre se interesó por la Ciencia Cristiana y a menudo meditaba sobre lo irreal del mundo físico y la transcendencia del error y la ilusión, y esto sin duda estimuló mi interés en cuestiones filosóficas.

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