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“The Eurozone Between Austerity and Default”: Varios autores

C. Lapavitsas, A. Kaltenbrunner, G. Lambrinidis, D. Lindo, J. Meadway,
J. Michell, J.P. Painceira, E. Pires, J. Powell, A. Stenfors, N. Teles

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
1. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………4
2. A PROFUSION OF DEBT: IF YOU CANNOT COMPETE, KEEP BORROWING …………………………………………………….7
2.1 THE MAGNITUDE OF PERIPHERAL DEBT ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
2.2. THE ECONOMIC ROOTS OF EXTERNAL DEBT ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF DEBT IN THE PERIPHERY ………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
3. RESCUING THE BANKS ONCE AGAIN …………………………………………………………………………………………. 23
3.1 BANKS IN THE EYE OF THE STORM ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 23
3.2 FUNDING PRESSURES ON EUROPEAN BANKS …………………………………………………………………………………….. 26
3.3 THE EUROPEAN SUPPORT PACKAGE AND ITS AIMS ………………………………………………………………………………. 29
3.4 WILL THE PACKAGE WORK? …………………………………………………………………………………………… 32
4. SOCIETY PAYS THE PRICE: AUSTERITY AND FURTHER LIBERALISATION …………………………………………………….. 34
4.1 THE SPREAD OF AUSTERITY AND ITS LIKELY IMPACT………………………………………………………………………………. 34
4.2 THE PERIPHERY TAKES THE BRUNT OF AUSTERITY POLICY ……………………………………………………………………….. 39
4.3 MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 40
5. THE SPECTRE OF DEFAULT IN EUROPE ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 47
5.1 DEFAULT, DEBT RENEGOTIATION AND EXIT ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 47
5.2 CREDITOR-LED DEFAULT: REINFORCING THE STRAIGHTJACKET OF THE EUROZONE …………………………………………. 49
5.3 DEBTOR-LED DEFAULT AND THE FEASIBILITY OF EXIT FROM THE EUROZONE …………………………………………………. 50
APPENDIX A THE CRISIS LAST TIME: ARGENTINA AND RUSSIA ……………………………………………………………….. 55
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS BRINGS COLLAPSE TO BUENOS AIRES…………………………………………………………….. 55
SOME LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 58
RUSSIA’S TRANSITION FROM A PLANNED ECONOMY: COLLAPSE AND RECOVERY …………………………………………………. 59
DEFAULT IS NOT SUCH A DISASTER, AFTER ALL …………………………………………………………………………………………. 61
APPENDIX B CONSTRUCTION OF AGGREGATE DEBT PROFILES ………………………………………………………………… 63
APPENDIX C DECOMPOSITION OF AGGREGATE DEMAND …………………………………………………………………….. 68

Artículo Completo

RMF occasional report
SEPTEMBER 2010

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