Segunda sesión del Seminario Marx Revisitado: “Michael Heinrich, ¿Cómo leer El Capital de Marx?”: Luis Arizmedi y Alejandro Fernando González
2da. Sesión 20 de marzo:
Michael Heinrich, ¿Cómo leer El Capital de Marx? Indicaciones de lectura y comentario del comienzo de El Capital, Escolar y Mayo Editores, 2011. Comentan: Mtro. Luís Arizmendi y Lic. Fernando González
La filosofía hegeliana del derecho no es, contrariamente a lo establecido por la oficialidad de la opinión filosófica, un proyecto positivo de construcción de un sistema jurídico-administrativo-económico para tal o cual región occidental de la Europa continental. No pretendemos extendernos sobre una cuestión planimétricamente geopolítica en torno al “objeto” nacional que fuese el contenido externo, de una lógica siempre externa en un caso tal: si bien ha tenido un profundo y extendido asidero en la hermenéutica hegeliana, poco nos importa si este contenido formal de la filosofía del derecho tiene por nombre “Prusia”, “Austria”, “Inglaterra”, o cualquier otro “Estado” particular. Esta discusión, que se sostiene entre el constante vaivén de los prismas hermenéuticos y filológicos, llena de contenido la formación analítica de un discurso interpretativo y se reviste de un carácter eminentemente fundamental para la comprensión de una proyección contextual de una analítica ejecutiva. Pero, esta fundamentalidad es ella misma la carencia y limitación de una ontología de la totalidad concreta. La radicalidad de la filosofía hegeliana del derecho no estriba en la constatación de una relación que podríamos malversadamente llamar “lógica” entre un contenido nacional y una dialéctica puramente abstracta como forma de conocimiento. Si depositamos la mirada en la exclusividad publicitaria de las Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts de 1821, caeremos estrepitosamente en las condiciones formales de la relación dialéctica entre la forma del conocer y la cuestión nacional.
“In Marx’s Laboratory. Critical Interpretations of the Grundrisse” Edited by Riccardo Bellofiore, Guido Starosta and Peter D. Thomas
Edited by Riccardo Bellofiore, University of Bergamo, Italy, Guido Starosta, National University of Quilmes, Argentina, and Peter D. Thomas, Brunel University, London In Marx’s Laboratory. Critical Interpretations of the Grundrisse provides a critical analysis of the Grundrisse as a crucial stage in the development of Marx’s critique of political economy. Stressing both the achievements and limitations of this much-debated text, and drawing upon recent philological advances, this volume attempts to re-read Marx’s 1857-58 manuscripts against the background of Capital, as a ‘laboratory’ in which Marx first began to clarify central elements of his mature problematic. With chapters by an international range of authors from different traditions ofinterpretation, including the International Symposium on Marxian Theory, this volume provides an in-depth analysis of key themes and concepts in the Grundrisse, such as method, dialectics and abstraction; abstract labour, value, money and capital; technology, the ‘general intellect’ and revolutionary subjectivity, surplus-value, competition, crisis; and society, gender, ecology and pre-capitalist forms.
Apart from your recent article, which has been translated into Chinese, which books have you written?
My first book, my PhD thesis, was Die Wissenschaft vom Wert (The Science of Value). It was first published in 1991 and a considerably extended edition appeared in 1999. After all the discussions of the late 1960s and 1970s, it was an attempt to determine the peculiar scientific kernel of Marx’s project of a Critique of Political Economy. I was occupied with the difference, on the one hand between early and late Marx, on the other hand with the difference between Marx and classical political economy but also with the difference between Marx and modern neoclassical economics. I tried to describe Marx’s fundamentally new project of critique of political economy, a project, which was not only meant to add a new theory to the existing theories, but to practice a critique of a whole science, to articulate a scientific revolution. But in this project of Marx’s you can also find some ambivalences: on the one hand, Marx broke with the old field of economic science, on the other in some of his inquiries he remained in this field, without realizing it. The simultaneity of break with this field, leaving this field and remaining in this field, caused certain problems in Marx’s theory, for example the well known “transformation problem.” The transformation from values to prices of production I can understand as a problem which is caused by this incomplete break with the field of political economy. It is not really a problem of Marx’s new theory; it is a problem of a mixture between old elements (which Marx had already criticized) and new elements.
AS WE know, the modern state was not formed as a result of some direct economic determination, as a mechanical super-structural outcrop, in conformity to a reductivist view of the sup-posedly one-sided material domination of society, as presented in the vulgar Marxist conception of these matters. Rather, it was dialectically constituted through its necessary reciprocal interaction with capital’s highly complex material ground. In this sense, the state was not only shaped by the economic foundations of society but it was also most actively shaping the multifaceted real-ity of capital’s reproductive manifestations throughout their his-torical transformations, both in the ascending and in the de-scending phase of development of the capital system.
In this complex dialectical process of reciprocal interchange the historical and the transhistorical determinations have been closely intertwined, even if in the course of the capital system’s descending phase of development we had to witness a growing violation of the historical dialectic, especially under the impact of the deepening structural crisis. For the defence of the estab-lished mode of societal reproduction at all cost, no matter how wasteful and destructive its impact by now even on nature, can only underline the historical anachronism and the corresponding untenability of a once all-powerful mode of productive societal reproduction, which tries to extend its power in a “globalized form” at a time when the absolute systemic limits of capital are being activated on a global scale.
“El ciclo equivalencial: valor de cambio, dinero y mercado“: tercera conferencia de Enrique Dussel sobre la crítica de la economía política de Marx de su curso ” 16 Tesis de Economía Política”
Primera conferencia de Enrique Dussel sobre la crítica de la economía política de Marx de su curso ” 16 Tesis de Economía Política”
I have argued in a number of papers (please see References) that there are two main stages (or levels of abstraction) in Marx’s theory in Capital. The first stage has to do with the production of surplus-value and the determination of the total surplus-value, and the second stage has to do with the distribution of surplus-value and the division of the pre-determined total surplus-value into individual parts (equal rates of profit, commercial profit, interest, and rent). The total amount of surplus-value is determined at the first stage (the production of surplus-value) and then this predetermined magnitude is presupposed in the second stage (the distribution of surplus-value). This key quantitative presupposition of the prior determination of the total surplus-value is repeated many times, in all the drafts of Capital, as I have shown in my papers. Thus, there is a clear logical progression from the determination of the magnitude of the total surplus-value in the first stage to the determination of the individual parts in the second stage. Other authors who have presented similar interpretations of the production and distribution of surplus-value and the prior determination of the total surplus-value in Marx’s theory include Paul Mattick, Roman Rosdolsky, Enrique Dussel, David Yaffe, and Duncan Foley.
“Marx’s Critique of (Ricardian) Political Economy, the Quantity Theory of Money and Credit Money”: John Milios
The Marxist concept of value is very frequently equated, whether explicitly or merely tacitly, with the corresponding Ricardian concept of “labour expended”. This paper argues that unlike the Ricardian theory of value, the Marxist theory of value is a monetary theory. In the Marxist system, the value of a commodity is expressed not through itself but through its distorted forms of appearance, in prices. Moreover, it cannot be defined in isolation, but exclusively in relation to all other commodities, in a process of exchange. In this relation of exchange value is materialised in money. The essential feature of the “market economy” (of capitalism) is thus not simply commodity exchange but monetary circulation and money. Commodity exchange presupposes thus the (positive) prices of all commodities involved. In other words, prices are not determined after the establishment of a non-monetary equilibrium system of barter between “production sectors”, like the Sraffian “linear production systems”. On the contrary, barter is for Marx non-existing, as all exchange transactions are made up of separate acts of exchange of commodities with money.